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Several developirig countries have used credit policies to 
achieve agricultural development goals. The Brazilian case is 
especially revealing because huge amounts of rural credit have been 
channeled to agriculture, and credit policy was such an important 
part of agricultural policy during the past couple of decades. 
This paper reviews Brazilian credit policies and the impact of 
credit on agriculture over the 1960-1985 period. It serves as an 
important updating of our earlier paper that analyzed developments 
as of the mid-1970's [Araujo and Meyer (1978)). This paper 
includes data from the 1980 census which confirm some of the trends 
identified in the earlier paper. It also includes new information 
on the highly controversial issue in Brazil of the magnitude and 
impact of subsidies provided through negative real interest rates 
on agricultural loans. 
1. A Brief Review of Agricultural Credit Policy 
Brazil pursued a rapid growth strategy during most of the 
period following the military takeover in 1964. Financial policy 
has served the function of financing the Federal budget, compen-
sating certain sectors (notably agriculture and exports) for the 
adverse consequences of price controls and exchange overvaluation, 
and attracting foreign funds to support the current account deficit 
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[World Bank (1984)]. The strategy clearly suggested a "supply-
leading" approach to finance and economic development. 
The stated objectives of agricultural credit were established 
in 1965 by the Agricultural Credit Law no. 4829: (a) finance a 
portion of operating costs of agricultural production and mark-
eting, (b) stimulate capital formation, (c) accelerate the adoption 
of modern technology, and (d) strengthen the economic position of 
farmers, especially small and medium ones. Credit policies have 
also been frequently adjusted to address short-term problems like 
changing input and product prices and weather problems. Agricul-
tural pricing and input policies have been used in conjunction with 
credit policy to influence factor use, enterprise selection and 
total output. 
In the mid-1960's, the National Monetary Council was given the 
responsibility for formulation of agricultural credit policy while 
the Central Bank was given the responsibility for administration. 
By 1978 the National System of Rural Credit had evolved to include 
the Central Bank, the Bank of Brazil and four other Federal banks, 
thirty-three (33) state banks, fifty-six (56) private banks and 
several other financial institutions of minor importance [World 
Bank (1984)]. The Bank of Brazil, however, has been by far the 
single most important credit source, especially in poorer areas and 
for small, low income farmers. 
A complex system of rules, regulations and programs was used 
during most of the past two decades to influence the quantity, 
price and allocation of credit. At times more than 30 special 
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credit programs were in effect for the benefit of target regions 
and borrowers. Three general features of agricultural credit 
policies dominated most of the period. First, nominal interest 
rates on agricultural loans have been controlled at levels below 
those permitted for other types of loans. These controls fre-
quently resulted in negative real rates of interest (i.e., nominal 
interest rates lower than the rate of inflation). Second, nominal 
interest rates for small agricultural loans (supposedly made to 
small farmers) have been set several percentage points below the 
ceilings specified for large loans. Third, incentives and controls 
have been used to induce banks to lend more of their own deposits 
and/or government funds to agriculture. 
2. credit and Performance of the Agricultural sector 
The most striking feature of the Brazilian agricultural credit 
system has been the vast amount of money involved. In some years, 
the volume of credit approached the volume of agricultural output. 
Recent data show that the rapid growth in credit we noted through 
the mid-1970's continued through the rest of the decade, but fell 
sharply in the 1980's for reasons described below. 
Table 1 shows loans made each year and agricultural production 
for the 1960-85 period1 • Columns 1 and 2 report operating loans, 
usually with terms of less than a year, which represented as much 
as 70% of the number and 60% of the value of loans made in recent 
years. The remainder of the credit is split between marketing 
loans2 with terms of a few months and investment loans payable over 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
a 
b 
c 
d 
e 
Table 1. - Agricultural Credit and Output, Brazil, 1960-85. 
Loans Made During Yeara 
----~~~~~~~~~-L~~~;b------------------r~~~i-~~~~~~i~~~~i-L~~~;-----
Numberc 
(1) 
112 
184 
337 
416 
527 
509 
529 
633 
733 
675 
649 
686 
687 
771 
789 
1,076 
1,059 
1.011 
1,104 
1.375 
1,876 
1,944 
1.826 
1,670 
1.194 
1,805 
Value in 1985 
Cruzeiros 
(2) 
3, 180 
3,280 
4,910 
4,410 
6,560 
5, 730 
6.700 
9,040 
11.470 
9,624 
10,992 
12,394 
14.706 
21,288 
27,757 
39,446 
38,886 
38,901 
45,698 
52,433 
56,406 
50,705 
53,857 
38,990 
27,010 
38,839 
Numberc 
(3) 
231 
285 
441 
549 
771 
666 
856 
1,029 
1,500 
1,145 
1,191 
1,253 
1. 266 
1. 400 
1,450 
1,856 
1. 832 
1,722 
1. 896 
2,373 
2.766 
2,613 
2,604 
2,470 
1, 585 
2,271 
Value in ~975 
Cruzeiros 
(4) 
6,176 
6, 157 
8,382 
7,267 
9,864 
8,483 
11. 539 
14,925 
21,019 
20,718 
24,648 
28,481 
35,321 
49,852 
61.648 
89,997 
92, 143 
82,266 
83,659 
104,248 
99,686 
86,458 
83 .725 
62,707 
38,319 
54,623 
Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) from 
Agriculture 
in 
1975 
Cruzeirosd,e 
(5) 
49,957 
50,755 
57,883 
49,131 
54,965 
57,366 
50, 128 
53, 194 
53,341 
56,866 
53 .717 
63,380 
72. 701 
91,297 
102,307 
1D7,349 
132,007 
159 .734 
133,280 
139,354 
142,952 
122,372 
104,495 
130,843 
140,504 
151,424 
Ratio of Operating 
Loans Made to 
Agricultural GDP 
(2/5) 
(6) 
0.06 
0.06 
0.08 
0.09 
0.12 
0.10 
0.13 
0 .17 
0.22 
0 .17 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.23 
0.27 
0.37 
0.29 
0.24 
0.34 
0.38 
0.39 
0.41 
0.52 
0.30 
0 .19 
0.26 
Ratio of Total 
Agricultural Loans to 
Agricultural GDP 
(4/5) 
(7) 
0.12 
0.12 
0.14 
0 .15 
0.18 
0.15 
0.23 
0.28 
0.39 
0.36 
0.46 
0.45 
0.49 
0.55 
0.60 
0.84 
0.70 
0.52 
0.63 
0.75 
0.70 
0. 71 
0.80 
0.48 
0.27 
0.36 
Source: Various Central Bank and Bank of Brazil reports (Brazil, Banco Central). Figures represent number and value of new loans made. 
From 1960 to 1968, the estimates for operating loans are based on loans made by the Bank of Brazil, which was responsible for the majority of 
agricultural credit lent during the period. 
Thousands of loans. 
1 million cruzeiros. Values adjusted by the index "2" of Conjuntura Economica (Brazil, Fundai;:ao Getulio Vargas). 
Source: Brazil, Fundai;:ao Getulio Vargas. 
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several years. 3 In this twenty-five year period, agricultural 
output approximately tripled while new loans made per year rose 
almost 9 times. The ratio of operating loans to agricultural 
output (column 6) rose from 0.06 in 1960 to a peak of 0.52 in 1982 
then fell to 0.26 in 1985, while the ratio of total loans to output 
rose from 0.12 to 0.80 then fell to 0.36. In 1975, the first ratio 
reached 0.37 and the second rose to 0.84 due, in part, to major 
funding for drought relief and coffee recuperation. The droughts 
of 1981 and 1982 reduced the value of agricultural output so the 
ratios appeared more favorable than they would have been if output 
would have continued its upward trend. These ratios are amongst 
the highest found in any Latin American country [Adams (1971)]. 
This huge amount of agricultural credit should have made a 
significant impact on the agricultural sector. Because of the 
problem of fungibility, however, it is difficult to conclusively 
attribute to credit the changes that have occurred in Brazilian 
agriculture during these past two decades. Although there appears 
to be a positive correlation between credit and output up to the 
late seventies, as shown by the data reported in Table 1, it is 
also evident that credit has grown faster than output, and output 
continued at high levels in some years when loan disbursements 
declined. 
In the first half of the 1980s, however, credit availability 
experienced significant contraction, but in spite of that decline 
agricultural output has increased. In the 1980-1985 period, the 
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real value of new loans decreased 
increased 6%. 
48% while agricultural GDP 
It is frequently argued that credit accelerated the adoption 
of both biological and mechanical technology. In the 1974-1981 
period, credit lines were available for purchasing so-called "mod-
ern inputs" including improved seeds, fertilizer, lime, agri-
cultural chemicals, and livestock rations. Nominal interest rates 
for these credit lines varied from o to 7% much of the time. 
Chemical fertilizer use rose dramatically from 380,000 metric tons 
in 1966 to a peak of 4.2 million tons in 1980, then falling to 3.3 
million in 1984. There have been reports of fraud in credit use 
because the quantity of fertilizer supposedly financed in some 
regions has exceeded the amount actually sold. Purchasers of 
domestically manufactured machinery had access to credit lines with 
five-year loans with nominal interest rates ranging up to 15%, 
occasionally with a two-year initial grace period. Domestic trac-
tor production per year grew from 6, 300 units in 1967 to over 
63,000 in 1976 but then declined to 44,687 units in 19844 [Brazil, 
Funda9ao Getulio Vargas ( 1983)). Over half of the investment loans 
are typically reported for machinery purchase, and about two-
thirds of these loans have been made in the states of Rio Grande 
do Sul, ParanA, and Sao Paulo, which accounted for over 70% of the 
tractors reported on farms in the 1970 and 1980 census. It is 
quite likely, then, that credit for investment has been highly 
correlated with new machinery purchases. 5 This conclusion is 
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consistent with the tractor demand models estimated by Sanders 
(1973) for 1950-71, and by Barros (1980) for 1960-76. 
The 1970 and 1980 census offer insights into the nature of 
investment occurring on Brazilian farms. Farmers reported invest-
ing Cr$ 4.4 billion in on-farm investments for the year of the 1970 
census, of which Cr$ 2.2 billion was spent for machinery, live-
stock, and permanent crops, all of which were eligible for loans. 
The Central Bank reported Cr$ 2. 5 billion in new institutional 
loans for agricultural investments that year [Brazil, Banco Central 
(1971)]. For the 1980 census, aggregate on-farm investments amoun-
ted to Cr$ 579.1 billion (equivalent to 25 billion in 1970 cruze-
iros), of which Cr$ 359.7 billion (15.6 billion in 1970 cruzeiros) 
were eligible for institutional loans. However, Central Bank 
statistics indicate only 7.0 billion (in 1970 cruzeiros) as the 
total value of new investment loans contracted by farmers in 1980. 
The data from both periods suggest that farmers self-finance a 
considerable amount of on-farm investment in spite of the large 
amount of credit borrowed. 
Changes in on-farm investment patterns should be reflected in 
the changing structure of farm capital. It was believed that the 
share of equipment rose while the share in real estate declined 
between 1940 and 1965 [Schuh (1970)]. Census data do not appear 
to support this trend, however. The 1970 census shows that 68% of 
total capital assets were represented by land and buildings, 18% 
in productive and work animals, 9% in permanent crops, and 5% in 
farm machinery and vehicles [Brazil, Funda9ao Institute Brasileiro 
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de Gergrafia e Estatistica {1975)]. Surprisingly, in the 1980 
census, these proportions were 74% for land and buildings, 12% for 
animals, 9.6% for permanent crops and 4.4% for machinery and vehic-
les [Brazil, Funda9ao Institute Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatis-
tica (1984)]. Thus, it appears that the value of land and build-
ings still commands a large and growing share of farm capital 
because of increases in farming area and land prices. Some of the 
large increase in credit availability may have been capitalized in 
land prices so that the land share has continued strong. 
3. Distribution of Farms and Credit 
One of the key issues presented in our earlier paper which 
has been the source of considerable debate concerns the distribu-
tion of loans made. Table 2 shows the size distribution of farms 
as reported in the 1970 and 1980 censuses. 6 The total number of 
farms increased from 3.3 million in 1960 to 4.9 million in 1970, 
and to 5.2 million in 1980. The total farm area increased from 
about 250 million hectares in 1960 to almost 295 million in 1970, 
and to 365 million in 1980. From 1960 to 1970, over a million new 
farms were added to the less than 10 hectares group, while the 1980 
census reports an increase of only 78. 4 thousand farms in this 
group. During the 1960-1980 period, the average size of the less 
than 10 hectare group decreased from almost 4 to 3.5 hectares. 
The inverse relationship between farm size and value of pro-
duction found in many countries was observed in Brazil in 1970 and 
1980. In the latter year, the first two size strata represented 
Table 2 - Size Distribution of Farmsa, Brazil, 1970 and 1980. 
1970 Census 1980 Census 
Farm Size Strata (Ha.) Farms Percentb Percent of Farms Percentb Percent of 
Number Percent of Area Product Number Percent of Area Product 
Less than 10 2,519,630 51.1 3.1 17.8 2,598,019 50.4 2.5 13.0 
IO to less than 100 1.934 ,392 39.3 20.4 40.0 2,016,774 39.1 17.7 37.7 
100 to less than 1,000 414 ,746 8.4 37.0 29.3 488,521 9.5 34.8 33.2 
1,000 to less than 10,000 35,425 0.7 27.2 10.7 45,496 0.9 28.7 13.9 
10,000 + 1,449 <0.1 12.3 1. 9 2,345 <0.1 16.5 2 .1 
No Farm Size Reported 18,377 0.4 0.3 8,696 0.2 0.1 
Total 4,924,019 99.9 100.0 100.0 5,159,851 100.0 100.2 100.0 
SOURCE: Funda~ao Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (Agricultural Census, 1970 and 1980). 
a In the Brazilian census, farms are defined as "establishments". A farm is a unit with one or more adjacent parcels under a 
single administration. Two nonadjacent parcels are treated as separate farms, even if they are under a single administration. 
Likewise parcels are treated separately even though owned by the same person if they are rented or sharecropped to two 
different persons with separate administration. 
b An unknown bias exists in these data due to the farms not reporting size. 
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89% of the farms with only 20% of the area, but 51% of the produc-
tion. Units of 10,000 or more hectares represented less than 0.1% 
of the farms, 16% of the area, but only 2% of the production. 
Surprisingly, almost 90% of the Brazilian farms reported no 
loans from any formal or informal source in the 1970 census and 
that proportion only fell to 80% by 1980. Even allowing for pos-
sible data limitations, credit use was much less widespread than 
anticipated. About one-third of the farms in the upper three size 
strata reported receiving loans in 1980. Only 4% of the farms in 
the smallest strata reported loans. Thus, a significant number of 
farms in the country were still untouched by formal credit programs 
after 15 years of a huge amount of agriculture lending. 
Table 3 reports the distribution of total volume of credit 
received by farmers in 1970 and 1980. Government entities provided 
87% of the Cr$ 347 billion in total loans reported in 1980 compared 
to 79% in 1970. This suggests a "crowding out" effect of informal 
credit sources. The two smallest farm size strata received far 
less credit than their share of farm numbers, while the three 
larger groups received far more in both years. Considering farm 
area, however, the first three strata received more credit than 
their land share. Considering value of production, the two small-
est strata received less credit than warranted by their production, 
while the 100 to 1,000 hectare group appeared to be especially 
favored with credit from government entities. Thus, according to 
the 1970 and 1980 census, Brazilian policy makers had not succeeded 
in increasing the share of agricultural credit lent to small 
farmers. 
Total Value: 
Value in cruzeiros of 1980b 
Percent 
Size Strata (Ha.): 
Less than 10 
10 to less than 100 
100 to less than 1,000 
1,000 to less than 10,000 
10,000 + 
No farm size reported 
Total 
Table 3 - Value and Distribution of Credit Received by Farm Size, Brazil, 1970 and 1980. 
A 11 
Sources 
95,182,934 
Sources of Credit (1970) 
Government 
Entities 
75, 121.831 
Other 
Sources a 
20,061.103 
A 11 
Sources 
347,031,189 
Sources of Credit (1980) 
Government 
Entities 
301. 506. 878 
Other 
Sources a 
45,524,310 
100.0 78.9 21.l 100.0 87.1 12.9 
---------------------------------------------- % -----------------------------------------------
5.5 4.2 10.4 4.9 4.5 7.4 
33.1 33.4 31. 7 31. 7 31. 7 31.8 
41.8 44.2 32.6 42.0 43.3 34.0 
15.6 15.2 17.1 18.1 17.8 19.9 
4.0 2.9 7.7 3.3 2.8 7.0 
0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 <0.1 
100.l 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.1 100.1 
a The 1970 Census reports the volume of credit from individuals and private entities, while the 
separately the volume of credit from cooperatives and combines credit from other sources. 
1980 Census reports 
b 
SOURCE: 
1 thousand cruzerios (real value adjusted by the !GP Index from Funda~ao Getulio Vargas). 
Funda~ao !nstituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (Agricultural Census, 1970 and 1980). 
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In more recent years, the distribution of loans made to dif-
ferent sizes of farm producers has been considered one of the key 
issues of several studies [Araujo and Meyer (1978), Kageyama and 
Hoffmann (1987), and Shirota (1988)). It also has been a source 
of considerable debate concerning the results of the rural credit 
policy in Brazil. The Bank of Brazil, for instance, reports that 
for the 1980 - 1983 period about 80% of the total number of loans 
made by this bank went to mini and small farmers, according to 
Central Bank definitions of the size of farm. However, the value 
of total loans was still highly concentrated in medium and large 
scale farmers. In 1980, they were responsible for 20% of the 
contracts and 59% of the total loan value. In 1983, the distribu-
tion improved at the national level in favor of mini and small 
farmers, as they received 37% of the credit value, while medium and 
large farmers received 48%. 
In the 1970-1985 period, the regional distribution of formal 
credit showed that approximately 85% of total loan value went to 
the most commercialized agricultural regions, that is, the South, 
Southeast, and Center-West (Table 4). These regions produce more 
than 80% of agricultural GDP. Regional credit distribution has 
undergone substantial transformation. In 1970, credit distribution 
was clearly concentrated in the Southeast with a 50% share. In 
1980 and 1985 that credit share had fallen to 34% and 26%, respec-
tively. The Northeast share has been relatively unchanged: 11% in 
1970, 16% in 1980 and 15% in 1985. The proportions for the North 
13 
Table 4. Loans Allocated to Agricultural Producers by Region in Brazi 1, 1970 - 1987. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Northeast Southeast South Center West Brazil 
-------------------------- ---------------------------- --------------------------- -------------------------- --------------------------- -----------------------
No. of Average No. of Average No. of Average No. of Average No. of Average No. of Average 
Contracts Value of Valuea Contracts Value of Valuea Contracts Value of Valuea Contracts Value of Valuea Contracts Value of - Valuea Contracts Value of Val 
Yr. (1000) Contract (1000) Contract (1000) Contract (1000) Contract (1000) Contract (1000) Contract 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
70 8 232 1,810 133 148 19,605 551 164 90, 190 427 135 57,659 70 168 11,783 1.188 152 181, 
71 11 206 2,280 207 132 27,303 558 173 96,622 409 167 68,339 65 233 15,143 1,251 168 209, 
72 17 248 4,219 202 157 31. 807 552 201 111.080 418 215 89,818 74 309 22,909 1,264 206 259,. 
73 16 314 4,919 198 212 42, 157 621 262 162,504 484 263 127,352 79 392 30,821 1,398 263 367, 
74 15 318 4,618 212 249 52,818 621 312 193,926 516 320 164,726 87 458 39,816 1,450 314 455,' 
75 21 407 8,637 254 332 84,481 745 336 250,519 714 356 253,903 122 550 67, 117 1,856 358 664,' 
76 25 462 11, 732 281 329 92,383 711 342 242,846 705 361 254,858 110 720 79,095 1.832 372 680,! 
77 27 428 11,486 262 296 77,450 695 318 220,894 638 376 239,623 101 578 58,474 1. 722 353 607 .~ 
78 34 400 13,751 291 269 78,230 733 301 220.721 722 313 225,951 115 518 59 .724 1,896 316 598,. 
79 58 351 20,229 435 248 107 ,951 848 315 267,015 879 331 290,950 154 548 84,227 2,373 325 770,. 
80 93 241 22,363 638 192 122,479 905 277 250,985 946 278 263,145 184 423 77 ,688 2,766 266 736, 1 
81 82 192 15,622 824 144 118,245 724 277 200, 185 817 292 238,792 166 397 66,062 2,613 245 638.~ 
82 72 173 12,451 616 145 89,020 811 266 215,155 913 261 238,540 193 329 63' 547 2,604 238 618, 
83 53 204 10,713 781 85 66,574 559 274 153,356 926 199 184,572 151 343 51. 821 2,470 189 467, 
84 25 181 4,564 456 86 39,063 414 213 88,321 589 197 116,254 102 364 37,067 1,585 180 285,. 
85 28 193 5,352 962 62 59,461 406 263 106,738 751 225 169,090 125 530 66, 156 2,271 179 406,-
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Banco Central do Brasil - DERUR. 
a Million Cz$ of 1987 
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region were 1% in 1970, 3% in 1980 and 1.2% in 1985. The South and 
the Center-West have experienced rising credit shares. From 1970 
to 1985 the share in the South increased from 32% to 41%. The 
share of the Center-West, which was 6.5% in 1970, almost tripled 
in 1985 to 16.3%. 
The Center-West has traditionally been the region with the 
largest average value of loan contracts. In 1985 the average 
contract size in the Center-West was about double that of the 
Southeast, 2.5 times that of the North and as much as 9 times that 
of the Northeast. The most remarkable observation is the substan-
tial reduction in average contract size in the Northeast. In this 
region, the shares of total credit value and number of contracts 
were both equal to 11% in 1970. In 1985 these shares were 15% and 
42%, respectively. The Center-West, on the other hand, has been 
the region with both the highest rate of growth of total credit and 
the highest average value of loan contract. 
With regard to number of contracts, the Northeast and South 
have been granted the largest shares. These shares were 42% and 
33% in 1985. The Southeast absorbed only 18% in the same year. 
Apparently the South and the Northeast have been the least affected 
regions by the policy changes of the eighties. In the mid-
eighties, these regions still had numbers of contracts comparable 
to those of the early-eighties. In the Southeast, however, the 
number of contracts in 1985 was more than 50% below that of 1980. 
A similar trend is observed in the North while the Center-West may 
be classified as an intermediate case. 
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4. Changes in credit Policy in the 1980 1 s 
Agricultural credit policy changed substantially after 1980 
[Araujo (1983a)]. External and internal debt problems, inflation 
rates ranging from 120 to 230% per year, and the high social cost 
and economic distortions prevailing in the financial markets in-
duced policy makers to implement a set of restrictive economic 
measures in 1981 and 1983 that affected the whole economy. In 
spite of efforts to establish real (and positive) interest rates 
for normal credit lines, the Central Bank reached this target only 
in 1984 (Resolution No. 876, Dec. 1983). In the 1970-1985 period, 
1984 was the exceptional year when farmers paid a small and posi-
tive real rate. 
The supply of agricultural loan funds has been seriously 
affected by the volume and composition of bank financial liabil-
ities. During much of the post-1965 period, commercial banks were 
obligated to lend to farmers at levels that approximated 30% of 
their demand deposits. At the beginning of the 1980's, the effects 
of growing inflation rates and the indexation of financial instru-
ments led to a radical change in the composition of bank liabil-
ities. This can be seen in the rapid decline of the share of 
demand deposits in the composition of total financial resources 
held by banks: 46% in 1970 vs. 28% in 1980 [Oliveira and Montezzano 
(1981)]. Thus the banks were able to meet their agricultural 
credit requirements by lending less to farmers. 
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On the demand side, farmers who had access to financial mar-
kets became reluctant to borrow in 1982, 1983, and 1985 for two 
reasons. The first was the frequent and unpredictable changes in 
monetary policy regarding interest rates and monetary correction, 
and the second was the prevailing conditions of risk within agri-
culture. 
s. The Subsidy Issue 
The implicit subsidy in rural credit policy has been a very 
controversial feature of the Brazilian experience. Throughout the 
1970-1985 period nominal interest rates for rural loans were lower 
than inflation rates. Some argue that this credit subsidy should 
be considered as a form of compensation for agriculture since this 
sector has been penalized by other economic policies. They also 
provide evidence that agricultural product prices have a larger 
variance than those of industrial products, and in most developed 
countries agriculture is heavily protected and subsidized through 
different schemes. On the other hand, others argue that the sub-
sidy should be directed towards production (via price policy) 
rather than through credit use. Furthermore, since credit is 
unevenly distributed among different farmers/regions, subsidies 
provided through credit favor only certain groups/regions. This 
fact implies that the distribution of the benefits of rural credit 
has contributed to a concentration of income and wealth [Graham et 
al. (1987)). 
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The interest rate subsidy, as measured by annual real interest 
rates, may be considered an indicator of the social cost associated 
with the credit policy. Table 5 presents recent estimates of the 
total amount of subsidies. First, the annual real rate of interest 
was calculated for each credit line considering the average loan 
terms7• Then, the total amount of subsidy was estimated in rela-
tion to the total value of rural loans made. In addition, this 
table shows two very comprehensive measures on the dimension of the 
implicit subsidy in interest rates. One is the ratio of subsidy 
to agricultural GDP, and the other is the ratio of subsidy to the 
country's GDP. 
During the 1970-85 period, five subperiods can be identified. 
In the 1970-73 period interest rate subsidies were small. In 1974, 
with the increase in volume of funds, acceleration of inflation and 
rigidity in rural credit interest rates, there was a significant 
increase in the subsidy. During the 1974-1978 period, the subsidy 
ranged between seven and eleven percent of the sector's GDP. This 
was equivalent to a resource inflow into the agricultural sector 
which fluctuated between 0.9% to 1.5% of the country's GDP. Even 
higher transfers occurred in 1979 and 1980 when the subsidy values 
represented almost 20% of the agricultural GDP or 2 .1% of the 
country's GDP. 
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Table 5. Rural Credit Subsidy and Ratio of the Subsidy to Agricultural GDP and 
to Total GDP, Brazil, 1970-1985 
Year Total Subsidy Subsidy/Agricultural Subsidy/Total 
(in Cz$ million of 1986) GDP Ratio (%) GDP Ratio (%) 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
722.3 
1,029. 0 
227.1 
484.6 
15.783.0 
17,256.9 
33,451.3 
22,300.2 
24,423.1 
59,170.9 
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34,506.8 
32,945.9 
25,945.9 
- 548.7 
1.146.1 
Source: Shirota (1988). 
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6.14 
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13.86 
8.71 
-0.17 
0.33 
0.07 
0.09 
0.02 
0.03 
0.88 
0.85 
1.45 
0.90 
0.94 
2 .15 
2.12 
1. 23 
1.19 
0.96 
-0.02 
0.04 
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In the years 1981 through 1983, with the decrease in volume 
of resources channelled to rural credit together with the rise in 
interest rates, the amount of subsidies decreased to levels between 
9 and 14 percent of agricultural GDP, and from 1.0 to 1.2 percent 
of total GDP. In the 1984-85 period interest rates for rural 
credit were set at levels close to the inflation rate. In fact, 
in 1984 a small positive real interest rate was paid by borrowers 
and the subsidy was kept at very low levels in 1985. In the fol-
lowing year, with changes in interest rates under the "Cruzado 
Plan", and an increase in the volume of funds lent to farmers, the 
subsidy probably returned to very high levels of both agricultural 
and total GDP. 
These results indicate that serious economic distortions may 
be caused by unstable economic policies such as those found in 
rural credit in Brazil. The fact that interest rate subsidies are 
realized only "ex-post" (at contract liquidation) must be consid-
ered. The subsidy rate can only be estimated in advance via ex-
pected price variations. The reasons why the government did not 
index interest rates to the variations of price levels is not well 
understood (Sayad (1979); Shirota (1988)). Indexation would have 
permitted (as it did after 1983) some control over the total in-
terest subsidy. 
6. conclusions and Implications 
Brazilian policy makers utilized a complex set of controls and 
incentives to increase the quantity and lower the cost of agri-
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cultural loans for roughly two decades beginning in the mid 1960's. 
The real volume of formal credit lent to farmers steadily increased 
until 1980 when it began to decline. As of 1980, most farmers 
still did not receive this credit, however, and the amount going 
to small farmers was especially low. Agricultural output and the 
use of some modern inputs have expanded. Since value of production 
is a criterion for lending, it is difficult to establish a clear 
line of causality between credit and agricultural performance. The 
expansion in use of modern inputs is associated with the increase 
in formal credit, but there has also probably been some substitu-
tion of external for internal funds, as well as the diversion of 
funds to nonagricultural and other uses. 
The banks' response to the distortions introduced in the 
financial market is understandable. Compensating balances and 
noninterest costs and fees have been widely used to increase the 
returns banks earn from agricultural loans. Banks with a clear 
profit orientation have been especially reluctant to increase long-
term agricultural lending. Loan procedures are cumbersome and 
increase borrowing costs. As demand deposits fell as a share of 
total bank financial resources (liabilities), so did the supply of 
agricultural loan funds. 
Two important unanswered questions exist regarding the 
Brazilian experience. First, what would have been the demand for 
and the impact of credit if agriculture would have been less dis-
criminated against through price controls, overvalued exchange 
rates, and export controls? Second, would bank performance have 
• 
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been better, especially on equity grounds, if there would have been 
more incentives for agricultural lending especially with higher 
interest rates? The two questions appear to be related. Subsi-
dized interest rates are rationalized to offset the discrimination 
of other policies. But interest rate controls reduce bank profit-
ability in agricultural lending. Thus, a logical tendency by banks 
is to reduce costs by lending to large farmers and to use nonprice 
methods to allocate the excess demand for credit created by low 
interest rates. 
Commercial banks can play an important role in financing 
agriculture in developing countries. The Brazilian experience 
suggests that establishing an appropriate set of incentives is 
crucial in affecting bank behavior. Flexible interest rates and 
simplified lending procedures are essential. General lines of 
credit should be created to meet agricultural development objec-
tives. The proliferation of specific credit lines and programs to 
resolve specific short-term agricultural problems must be avoided. 
The small farmer problem, however, may require a special line of 
credit, including loans for land purchase, and subsidized loans in 
the North and Northeast regions. 
The Brazilian case also demonstrates the dilemma that can 
emerge between agricultural credit policies and macroeconomic 
policies, especially monetary policies when large amounts of sub-
sidies are involved. Significant changes were made in agricultural 
credit policy in the 1980s because of needed adjustments in macro-
economic policies. The inflationary effects of huge amounts of 
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agricultural credit were no longer supportable. The performance 
of the Brazilian agriculture in the eighties raises the question 
of explaining output and productivity gains, despite the severe 
fall in credit use. Also beginning in the 1980's, policy makers 
began to look towards other policy instruments to stimulate the 
agricultural sector. Agricultural price policies, investments in 
human capital, and trade programs are expected to play significant 
roles compared to credit policy in the coming years. It is rel-
evant to note, however, that there still remains a crucial issue 
for the Brazilian policymakers, namely to define and establish a 
stable and long-term strategy for a new stage of agricultural 
finance pol icy. In this new framework, credit policy could be 
gradually adjusted to become primarily an instrument to increase 
farmers' liquidity rather than being used as a short-run or even 
an emergency policy instrument. The two neglected issues of the 
role of informal finance in agricultural and the potential for 
savings mobilization in rural areas must be carefully studied so 
that more rational rural credit policy can be implemented. 
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Endnotes 
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Brasil," in Dale W Adams, et al. 
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1. Unlike the data found in many countries, these data report 
loans made rather than outstanding balance. Furthermore, loan 
delinquency and default have not been problems in Brazil so 
these data effectively report the amount of new loans chan-
neled into agriculture with previous levels of indebtedness 
representing a small amount of the value of loans made. 
2. Substantial amounts of marketing loans go to individuals other 
than farmers. Thus, column 2 underestimates the total short-
term credit obtained by farmers, while column 4 overestimates 
total credit. 
3. Little institutional credit is available for farm real estate 
mortgages, so investment loans are lent largely to finance 
machinery, livestock, and perennial crops. 
4. From 1980 to 1983 a contraction was observed in the demand for 
both fertilizers and tractors. 
5. In 1980 the supply of institutional credit for investments 
exhibited a substantial decline. 
6. See footnote b, table 2 regarding the definition of a farm 
used in the census. 
7. For each year the rate of subsidy implicit in interest rates, 
for each line of credit, was estimated using the following 
formula: 
where: 
i 
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=the subsidy rate for the ith credit line, adjusted for 
the loan term. 
=is the annual interest rate (in real terms) for the ith 
credit line and it is given by: 
r. = (j i - l) 
1 (1 + 1) 
where: ji is the nominal interest rate for the ith credit 
line; and 
1 is the annual inflation rate. 
= the average loan term (in months) for the i th credit 1 ine 
(9 months for operating loans for "modern inputs" 
acquisition; 12 months for investments; and 3 months for 
marketing loans) . 
= index for the credit line. 
I . 
